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Abstract
Deep neural networks are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples, which imposes
severe security issues for these state-of-the-art models. Many defense methods
have been proposed to mitigate this problem. However, a lot of them depend on
modification or additional training of the target model. In this work, we analytically
investigate each layer’s representation of non-perturbed and perturbed images and
show the effect of perturbations on each of these representations. Accordingly, a
method based on whitening coloring transform is proposed in order to diminish the
misrepresentation of any desirable layer caused by adversaries. Our method can be
applied to any layer of any arbitrary model without the need of any modification or
additional training. Due to the fact that full whitening of the layer’s representation
is not easily differentiable, our proposed method is superbly robust against white-
box attacks. Furthermore, we demonstrate the strength of our method against some
state-of-the-art black-box attacks.
1 Introduction
Despite their prevalent success in a wide variety of domains, deep neural networks (DNN) become
highly vulnerable when facing adversarial perturbations [1, 2]. From the security perspective,
performance and robustness are of equal values; an ideal computational model ought to not only
perform well, but also maintain its performance robustness against different attacks when deployed
in the environment. However, adversarial attacks are severe threats to the robustness of DNN models.
These attacks can target wide variety of domains from Google Cloud Vision [3] to autonomous cars
[4]. Therefore, it is crucial to study the security of DNN models and a new line of research is recently
established to investigate and circumvent the issue [5, 6].
Adversarial attacks are generated by adding minimal perturbations (which seems imperceptible to
a human observer) to an image in order to mislead the target model. Due to the transferability of
adversarial attacks[7], crafted adversaries for one model can be effectively used against other models.
Generally, adversarial attacks lay into two categories: white-box and black-box attacks. In white-box
attacks, the attacker has full access to the parameters of model and uses the gradients of the model in
order to generate perturbations capable of fooling the target model [2, 8, 9, 10]. In black-box attacks,
the access to the target model is limited; one have only access to the inputs and output scores of the
target model [11]. Black-box attacks are considered a severe security issue against many practical
applications since they can lead to catastrophic consequences in applications such as medical image
analysis [12] and self-driving cars [4] where the attacker might not have full access to parameters of
the models.
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Figure 1: The intuition behind our proposed method. We refine the feature representations of
DNNs’ hidden layers in order to diminish the unfavorable effects of adversarial perturbations. In order
to do so, we use WCT to change the channel correlations of the adversarial example’s representation
in deep layers of the network.
Many different defense methods are designated to alleviate this unfavorable phenomenon such as
pre-processing [13], noise reduction [14], and using deep models [15, 16]. These defense methods are
based on the modification of deep neural networks. Even though they are effective against black-box
adversarial attacks, they are still vulnerable to white-box attacks. Likewise, another method of
defense, adversarial training [2], is shown to be effective against adversarial examples at which a
number of adversaries are injected into the training data. However, In order to make our model
robust using adversarial training, we need to retrain the model. Furthermore, finding appropriate
adversarial examples itself is a complex challenge [8]. Some of the recent defense methods exploited
several transformations in order to remove distortions in the image space. Guo et al. [17] investigated
input transformation such as cropping, bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, and total variance
minimization while Song et al. [18] performed SAAK transform. They not only deny the attacker
access to easy gradients but are also effectively robust against black-box attacks. Moreover, they do
not impose any additional training on the model. Xu et al. [13] proposed several strategies, including
median smoothing and bit-depth reduction, to destruct adversarial perturbations spatially. In spite of
all of that, many of the aforementioned methods are proven to fail against adversarial attacks[19, 20].
However, [21] withstood many adversarial attacks, and is considered to be the current state-of-the-art
defense strategy. MALADE [22], drives off-manifold adversarial samples towards high-density
regions of the data generating the distribution of the target class by the Metroplis-adjusted Langevin
algorithm (MALA) with perceptual boundary taken into account.
Xie et al. [23] pointed out that the presence of noise in feature representation of neural nets. in
order to demonstrate this, they visualized the feature maps they give rise to. Inspired by this, they
developed new architectures that decrease the noise in representations of adversaries and trained the
resulting model end-to-end. Our work is substantially different from theirs. Firstly, we use a more
analytical way to show the presence of adversaries in neural network’s representations. Moreover, in
order to alleviate this noise, we do not modify the architecture nor the weights of the network leading
to no need for additional training.
Due to the difficulty of performing security evaluations on defense methods, many of these methods
break almost immediately after being introduced [24]. For example, many defenses submitted to
ICLR 2018 were broken before the review period even finished [20]. Therefore, Carlini et al. [24]
suggest several methods for evaluating defense strategies. We attempt to perform each item in their
evaluation checklist to ensure the validity of our approach.
In this work, we investigate the transformation of layers’ feature representations, refining them in
order to remove the effects of perturbations from the latent representations, as a method of defense
against both white and black-box attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this setting has not been
investigated before from this perspective. Specifically, we propose the use of whitening coloring
transform, as a method of representation refinement, in order to defend against adversarial examples.
We begin with an analysis on the effect of adversarial perturbations on each layer’s learned feature
representation in DNNs where we use nearest-neighbor algorithm to evaluate the deviation of the
perturbed sample from its correct class, and we show that as the input representation goes deeper in
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Figure 2: t-SNE visualization of features learned by different layers of VGG16 network to illustrate
the gradual detrimental effect of adversarial perturbations. Black dots represent perturbed samples
with correct class of gray. Note that, the perturbed samples are within their correct class in the image
space whereas they have deviated towards incorrect classes in deep layers.
Layer4 Layer7 Layer10 Layer13
Clean 95.53 98.91 98.20 96.75
Adversarial 69.19 44.51 26.35 23.29
Table 1: Accuracies of nearest-neighbor algorithm on feature representation of different layers on
perturbed and clean samples. At deeper layers of the network, the perturbed samples’ accuracy drop
progressively which shows that the representations get closer to wrong classes.
the network, it strays further from its correct class. This motivated us to come up with a method to
refine feature representation in order to alleviate the effect of adversarial attacks.
Our method is model-agnostic and can be applied to any application. Since full whitening of any
layer’s input is not easily differentiable[25], our proposed method is robust against white-box attacks.
As well as this, the effectiveness of our method against black-box attacks is demonstrated by reporting
the results of our method against some state of the art black-box and white-box attacks.
To summarize, our work tackles the problem of adversarial perturbation in DNNs and presents an
effective approach to mitigate the aforementioned problem. The contribution of this paper is thus
manifold:
• We analyze the impact of perturbations on feature representation of different layers in DNNs.
We illustrate that as the input flows through the network, there will be a gradual shift of
feature representation towards the incorrect classes.
• Inspired by our analysis, we propose a novel defense method to refine feature representation
of DNN’s hidden layers. We show that one can refine the adversarial examples’ representa-
tion by whitening coloring transform and consequently, diminish the effect of adversarial
perturbations drastically.
• Through extensive experiments, we prove the validity of our analysis and proposed method
using some state-of-the-art black-box and white-box adversarial attacks.
2 Analysis of the Learned Representations
In this section, we analyze the impact of adversarial attacks on the feature representation of shallow
and deep layers of neural networks. This analysis is the foundation on which we present our proposed
method in Sec. 3.
Deep neural networks learn a hierarchical set of representations and as the input flows through,
the learned feature representation grows progressively abstract and each class’s representation gets
further from the others, for the sake of classification. In the presence of an adversary, as the image
goes deeper into the network, its corresponding feature representation seems to deviate from its
correct class, constantly. At the classification layer, the deviation from the correct class seems to be
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enlargened enormously, throwing the model into confusion and resulting in misclassification; Hence,
we focus our analysis on scrutinizing the internal representations of clean and perturbed data.
In Fig. 2, we use t-SNE algorithm [26] to visualize the distance between the corresponding feature
representations of each class. The adversarial examples are within the incorrect classes in deep layers
of the network. To analyze this more accurately, we use the nearest-neighbor algorithm on those layers
and calculate the accuracy in Table 1. As the adversarial inputs get deeper into the network, their
corresponding nearest-neighbor algorithm’s accuracy drops indicating that these samples are getting
further away from their correct class’s samples. As a consequence, adversarial examples would
have representations closer to incorrect classes at the classification layer, since the misrepresentation
accumulates at this layer, resulting in being misclassified by the network.
Following, we will present our proposed method as a tool to alleviate any target layer’s misrepre-
sentation. In Sec. 4, we demonstrate the significant impact of our method on the aforementioned
misrepresentation by calculating nearest-neighbor accuracy of the refined feature representations.
3 Proposed Method
As discussed before, deep neural networks are extremely vulnerable to adversarial perturbation
and it is because their layers misrepresent the adversaries. Also, we demonstrated that, in case of
perturbations, this misrepresentation accumulates layer by layer, meaning that model’s representation
of the input image strays further from the space of image’s correct class (in deeper layers of DNNs).
Studying adversarial perturbations from this perspective leads to the idea that refining the inputs’
latent representations can possibly become beneficial in order to defend effectively against such
adversaries.
In what follows, we will explain the Whitening Coloring Transform (WCT) in depth and define
several useful notations (section 3.1). Thereupon, we will expound our novel method of refining the
layers’ representation in detail (section 3.2).
3.1 Whitening and Coloring Transform (WCT)
Consider an arbitrary multivariate Gaussian random vector X with arbitrary mean and covariance ma-
trix, and Y , a multivariate Gaussian random vector with desirable mean and covariance matrix. WCT
is the process in which the mean and covariance of Y are imposed onto X using two transformations
details of which are as follows.
Whitening is the transformation of a target random vector X , to another random vector W with unit
diagonal covariance matrix meaning that the components of our new random vector are uncorrelated
and have variances equal to 1 (this transformation is referred to as "whitening" since the output
resembles a white noise). Coloring is somehow the inverse of whitening where the desirable mean
and covariance matrix are imposed to W .
Before whitening and coloring, both X and Y are centered by subtracting their mean vectors mx and
my respectively. Now consider the eigen-decompositions of covariance matrices of X and Y
Σx = ΦxΛxΦ
−1
x Σy = ΦyΛyΦ
−1
y (1)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix with eigenvalues of Σ and Φ is the matrix of corresponding orthonormal
eigenvectors such that Φ−1 = ΦT .
Now X is transformed into W which is the uncorrelated version of X
W = ΦxΛ
− 12
x Φ
T
xX (2)
where Λ−
1
2
x ΦTx decorrelates X to have a covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix. Φx maps W
to the same space as X since the coordinate system has been changed after transforming X with ΦTx ,
and has no effect on the covariance matrix.
Then, the coloring transform is performed on the acquired W :
X ′ = ΦyΛ
1
2
y Φ
T
yW +my (3)
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Figure 3: t-SNE visualization of 13th layer’s representation. Black dots represent perturbed samples
with correct class of gray. Note that, after our refinement, the representations are closer to their
correct class’s samples.
Here, ΦyΛ
1
2
y imposes the desired covariance matrix. Again, ΦTy just assures that X
′ ends up in the
same space as W since the coordinate system will be transformed by Φy later on and it has no effect
on the covariance of X ′ as well. Finally, the desired mean vector my will be added to the transformed
representation. So now X ′, a multivariate Gaussian random vector, is obtained which has contents of
X , with our desired mean and covariance matrix.
Here, we define several useful notations. Let Ip and Ic denote an adversarial example and its
corresponding clean image, respectively. L(I) denotes correct class label of an image I and let φk be
the mapping from the image to its internal DNN representation at layer k where φ0 means the image
itself. Also, consider Γ(φk(I)) as the image corresponding to nearest-neighbor of φk(I).
3.2 Feature representation refinement
As we have debated, adversarial perturbation has an immense negative effect on layers’ feature
representations. This makes the neural network misunderstand the image leading to incorrect
decision-making. Here we propose a method to refine the layers’ representations, as a method of
defense against adversarial examples. We perform WCT on the target layer’s representation of the
image (φk(I)), in order to refine its features to one that is semantically in close vicinity of its true
class (L(I)). To be precise, in order to refine an adversarial example’s representation, we do the
following.
For a desirable layer k and an adversary Ip, first, layer k’s feature representation of Ip is whitened
using Eq.3.1 such that the channels of transformed φk(Ip) are uncorrelated to each other and have
variances of 1:
Wp = Whiten(φk(Ip)) (4)
where Wp has the same dimension and is in the same space as Ip but its channels no longer have
any correlation to each other. Table 4 represents several whitened adversarial examples. As we can
see, the contents, pixels representing the most important features, are preserved while the noise is
dropped tremendously.
At this point, we may perform coloring and we would like to enforce a desirable correlation to the
channels ofWp for which the layer k’s representation of an image Iy is needed. An optimal choice for
Iy is to choose its corresponding clean image (Ic) which is obviously impractical. A second optimal
choice can be a random clean image whose label is the same as that of the adversary (L(Ip)) which
as well is clearly nonviable (Table 4 shows how different images for Iy affect the network). We found
that a good candidate for Iy can be the nearest-neighbor of Ip in the training set (even better than a
random image with correct label which shows that our model is not dependent on nearest-neighbor’s
accuracy (Table 1) ) meaning that:
Iy = Γ(φj(Ip)) for j ≤ k (5)
where we choose j = 0, the nearest-neighbor in the image space, for most of our experiments since it
is more beneficial in terms of both computation and accuracy. This is due to the fact that adversaries
have stronger effects on deeper layers, as stated in section 2). Now, after the calculation of Iy, we
impose φk(Iy)’s channels’ correlations to the channels of W such that the new features of layer
k, φ′k(Ip), have the same content as φk(Ip) but with channel correlation of φk(Iy). In Table 4, the
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Dataset Attack No Att No Def Layer7 Layer10 Layer13 All 3 Layers
MNIST
FGSM0.3 99.52 19.94 51.62 81.46 91.12 91.46
PGD0.3 99.52 4.76 27.37 69.19 90.61 90.98
CWL2 99.52 0.72 11.63 67.42 91.27 92.38
MIM0.3 99.52 4.32 17.05 67.51 84.04 85.48
SaltnPepper 99.52 32.39 - - 88.91 89.63
F-MNIST
FGSM0.3 91.55 13.48 11.62 69.55 84.78 84.69
PGD0.3 91.55 2.57 10.58 66.52 84.22 84.34
BIM0.05 91.55 5.31 10.04 71.91 84.49 84.16
Fonts
FGSM0.3 91.35 5.33 11.53 80.85 85.86 85.72
PGD0.3 91.35 3.24 15.66 80.66 85.42 85.89
BIM0.05 91.35 4.52 56.74 82.05 85.32 85.72
Table 2: Comparison of the accuracies of our method under different settings. Each column shows
which layer we have put the WCT on.
FGSM0.3 PGD0.3
Layer7 Layer10 Layer13 model Layer7 Layer10 Layer13 model
Adv. 44.51 26.35 23.29 19.94 18.45 7.61 4.82 3.89
Layer7 88.50 60.99 54.54 53.57 58.68 20.63 18.89 18.11
Layer10 - 90.12 76.54 81.46 - 73.13 53.78 63.82
Layer13 - - 90.94 91.12 - - 80.24 90.61
All 3 Layers 88.50 91.98 91.94 91.46 58.68 83.34 90.57 90.98
Table 3: The effect of using our refinement on different layers of the network. Each row shows which
layer we have put the WCT on and each column shows the nearest-neighbor’s accuracy on different
layers’ representations. First row shows the accuracies on the vanilla network and last column shows
the accuracy of the whole model.
reconstructions of φ′k(Ip) for some adversarial examples are illustrated. As one can spot, the global
structures and contents are maintained while the noise has been annihilated perfectly.
The new features (φ′k(Ip)) are then propagated through the rest of the network. Noticeably, our
method can be applied to any number of layers simultaneously. In Fig. 3 we show the effectiveness
of our method using t-SNE visualization.
4 Experiments and Results
We empirically evaluate our feature representation refinement method. We test our method in different
settings (i.e. applying it on different layers) and investigate its refinement effect. Based on the
evaluation checklist introduced in [24], we verify the correctness and effectiveness of our model. Our
experiments are conducted on three publicly available datasets: MNIST[27], Fashion-MNIST[28],
and Letters[29].
Implementation details. For all experiments, we use VGG16, and in order to visualize the denoizing
effect of our method, VGG19 is used. Furthermore, for all experiments comprising nearest-neighbor,
we use only 200 samples for each class randomly selected from almost 16.6% of the training set in
order to have the minimum computational overhead. Likewise, for all of our t-SNE visualizations,
we use 200 images of each class as the clean data and 15 adversarial examples.
4.1 Ablation analysis
4.1.1 WCT at different layers
WTC technique has different effects depending on which layer it is applied upon. To investigate this,
WTC is applied on different layers of the target network and the results are presented in Table 1. In
section 2, we discussed that in the presence of adversaries, latent features of images strays further
from its correct class at deeper layers of the network. In table 3, we demonstrate the proficiency of
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image domain Layer7 Layer10 Layer13 correct class ground truth
Accuracy 91.36 37.11 21.14 19.64 90.54 94.27
Table 4: Comparison on the effectiveness of different choices for WCT’s clean image. Note that,
throughout this experiment, WCT is performed on 13th layer of VGG16.
Defenses FGSM BIM MIM PGD C&W
 = 0.2 , c = 1
Baseline 12.9 12.2 16.1 6.3 30.6
Yu 70.3 77.1 - - 79.1
Ross 60.4 32.1 29.3 44.2 75.3
Pang 52.8 73.6 77.5 41.0 78.1
Mustafa 77.9 77.3 82.0 80.2 91.2
Ours 91.2 92.1 89.4 92.2 92.3
 = 0.3 , c = 10
Mustafa 85.2 81.9 82.8 80.8 83.5
Ours 91.3 89.3 84.0 90.6 91.2
Table 5: Comparison on MNIST. For our
model, we report results with transformation
on the last convolutional layer.
Defenses FGSM MIM
Baseline 53.34 1.13
Bit Depth Reduction (1-bit) 86.96 89.02
Median Smoothing (2x2) 57.37 28.63
Median Smoothing (3x3) 54.44 27.19
JPEG (Q=10) 61.03 44.19
JPEG (Q=75) 53.75 17.65
Ours 92.3 92.0
Table 6: Comparison with some pre-
processing methods on MNIST. The pertur-
bation magnitude() of 0.1 is used for both
attacks.
our method on feature representation refinement. In order to do so, we put our proposed method on
different layers of the network, and by a similar experiment to that of section 2, we seek the refined
representation’s nearest neighbor accuracy in the subsequent layers. As one can see, the improvement
after WCT is considerable. In fact, the deeper we do the WCT, the better results we achieve (when
using only one WCT). We argue that this is due to the fact that deeper layers’ representations are
more sparse (for the sake of classification) and their values have stronger correlations to each other.
Therefore, imposing correct correlations to a perturbed sample at these layers will have a higher
reward. Also, performing the transform on all layers of the network has a considerable effect on every
layer and subsequently, the accuracy of the model. We suggest using our method on last layers if
multiple WCTs is not possible (since performing the transformation on deep layers has acceptable
performance and much less computational overhead).
4.1.2 Nearest-neighbor from different layers
Table 4 presents a comparison of the effectiveness of choosing WCT’s clean image Iy (using the
nearest-neighbor algorithm) from different layers of the model in order to find an appropriate mean
and covariance. It is shown that the best practical choice for Iy is the nearest-neighbor of the
adversary in the image space. Likewise, choosing the clean image from shallower layers has much
better performance since adversarial attacks have a huge impact on the representation of deeper layers.
This stems from the fact that the misrepresentation caused by adversarial perturbations accumulates
at later layers, as discussed in section 2.
4.2 Robustness of WCT refinement
First off, in table 2, we can see that the proposed model, against the vanilla model, has an acceptable
accuracy drop of almost 1.5% on clean data. Thereon, the effectiveness of our method (placed at
different layers) is evaluated against different attacks (FGSM[2], BIM[30], PGD[21], and CW[9] and
MIM[10]) with different distortions on the three datasets mentioned before. The attacks’ subscripts
denote the L∞ constraint imposed onto them except for CW whose subscript denotes its constant.
These attacks were performed in a black-box manner where the adversaries are created against a
pre-trained vanilla model (VGG16) and transferred to the same model with our method in different
settings. This is because of the fact that it is near to impossible to pass the gradient through our
method and the randomness of the nearest-neighbor (since there is no guarantee that the selected
nearest-neighbor would remain the same for the clean and adversarial samples). Lastly, in fig. 4
we demonstrate that, as the distortion bound () increases, the robustness of our method is reduced,
monotonically. Furthermore, for unlimited distortion (L∞ = ∞) it shows near to 0% robustness
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Defense Clean FGSM FGSM PGD C&W(0.05) (0.15)
Baseline 90.9 60.7 18.6 0.0 0.0
FGSM0.2 90.3 81.1 58.5 2.0 54.4AdvTrain
FGSM0.4 89.0 80.5 76.0 14.9 82.3AdvTrain
PGD AdvTrain 83.5 81.5 77.7 67.3 84.9
Distillation 88.1 80.4 80.2 80.1 0.0
Defense-GAN 83.5 78.9 69.0 49.8 37.9
BCGAN 85.4 83.8 83.8 83.6 85.9
Ours 89.2 84.9 84.5 84.1 85.6
Table 7: Comparison with different defense meth-
ods against various attacks on the Fashion-MNIST.
Figure 4: Robustness of our model
against various perturbation bounds
() on FGSM.
which is expected of any defense model [24]. Also, the reconstruction of denoised feature embeddings
of adversaries can be found in Appendix 6.1.
4.3 Comparison with prior defences
We compare the robustness of our method against the majority of existing defenses. Firstly, we
use gradient-based attacks done in a black-box manner. we compare the robustness of our method
against several adversarial perturbation based defenses on the MNIST dataset. We used the accuracies
reported by [31] and we find our proposed method to outperform the others (Table 5). As the second
category of prior defenses, we consider several transformation-based methods. These models apply
various transformations on the input in order to denoise the adversary. Table 6 demonstrates the
prominence of our method against these defenses footnoteIn order to report defense accuracy in this
table, we used the corresponding Advertorch implementations.. Table 7 presents our experiments
on F-MNIST dataset. Here, we use the reported accuracies in [32], and again, our method beats the
state-of-the-art under most settings.
5 Conclusion and Future Works
In this work, we studied the effect of adversarial perturbations on feature representations of hidden
layers and we proposed a novel method to tackle this problem. Our method tries to refine the
adversaries’ latent representations and is independent of any modification or additional training of
the model. Moreover, our method is robust against white-box attacks since computing the gradients
of whitening coloring transform is hard and has huge computational overhead. As well as this, we
demonstrated the effectiveness of our model against several state-of-the-art black-box attacks.
Although the experimental results show that the proposed method is a simple yet effective model-
agnitic tool against adversarial attack, it is by no means perfect; utilizing nearest-neighbor algorithm to
find a clean image from training data for refinement of deep layers not only introduces computational
overhead, but it also can fall short for more complex problems and datasets, indicating the demand to
invest more in this research topic.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Feature Reconstructions
Figure 5: Visualizing the refined and whitened representations of several adversarial examples.
In figure 5, the effectiveness of our method is visualized. To do so, we use VGG19 auto-encoder
and use WCT on its encoder’s 16th layer. Here, the corresponding clean image, the chosen nearest-
neighbor, and the adversarial input itself are shown in the first three rows, respectively. Further, the
reconstruction of the whitened representation is shown in the fourth row and at the last row; the
reconstruction of the refined representation is demonstrated where the noise seems to be neutralized
almost completely.
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